410_C232
INSURER
DENIES CAR THEFT CLAIM
Personal
Automobile
|
Theft
|
Voluntary
Parting
|
|
On
March 4, 2008, Barry Byrd parked
his 2005 Lamborghini at a car dealership owned by David Jordan. Byrd and Jordan
had an established business relationship whereby Jordan would sell cars for
Byrd. If Jordan had an interested
buyer, Byrd would sell the car to Jordan for an agreed-upon
price. He would sign the car title over to Jordan. Jordan would then sell the
car to the interested buyer. Jordan’s brother was also in
the car dealership business but Byrd never had business dealings with him.
Byrd
returned to the dealership and discovered that the Lamborghini was gone. Jordan’s brother told him
that he had sold the vehicle. David Jordan followed up with Byrd about a week
later and confirmed that the vehicle had indeed been sold. On May 28, Byrd and
Jordan agreed to a sale price of $225,000, which was to be paid within 30 days.
Also on May 28, Byrd cancelled the automobile policy he had maintained on the
Lamborghini. The policy had been issued by United Services Automobile
Association (USAA).
Byrd
never received the $225,000, and the vehicle was never returned to him. By June 30, 2008, Jordan’s car dealership was
closed and neither Jordan nor his brother could be located. The car dealer for
the buyer claimed that she had paid Jordan’s brother $225,000
and that he had promised to deliver the title to her. She took possession of
the vehicle on May 22, 2008, but she never
received the title from Jordan’s brother.
According
to Byrd, when Jordan contacted him on May
24, Jordan told him that the
buyer had paid only part of the sale price. Byrd deposed that upon filing a
theft report with the police in July 2008, he learned the buyer's identity,
contacted her, and learned that she had paid more than $200,000 for the
vehicle. Byrd stated that he had never agreed to sell the vehicle.
Byrd
continued to make payments for the vehicle to the bank that had financed the
vehicle and retained the title.
On
July 21, 2008, Byrd filed a theft
claim with USAA. The insurer denied the claim on the ground that there had been
no criminal taking of the vehicle and there was no felonious intent to steal
the vehicle. Byrd filed suit against USAA, alleging breach of contract and bad
faith. The trial court found in favor of USAA as a matter of law. Byrd
appealed.
The
relevant portion of the policy stated: “Loss means direct and accidental damage
to the operational safety, function, or appearance of, or theft of, your
covered auto . . .” On appeal, USAA argued that, while it was undisputed that
the proceeds from the sale had been stolen, there was no evidence that the
vehicle itself was stolen at the time the policy was in effect. Byrd argued
that the loss of his vehicle resulted from theft by taking and theft by
conversion, which the policy covered.
The
Court of Appeals of Georgia agreed with Byrd.
The court noted that there was evidence from which a jury could find the
fraudulent intent required to commit theft by conversion. Jordan’s brother allegedly
told the buyer’s dealer that Byrd had consented to the sale of the car when in
fact he had not. In addition, Jordan allegedly told Byrd
he would pay him $225,000 within 30 days but he never did. Finally, there was
evidence that by the end of June the dealership was closed and neither Jordan
nor his brother could be located.
The
court rejected USAA’s argument that Byrd had ratified the sale by agreeing to
the sale price. According to the court, by the time Byrd agreed to the sale
price, the car was already in the possession of the buyer’s dealer. Based on
this evidence, the appeals court decided that the trial court had erred by
finding in favor of the insurer as a matter of law. The court concluded that there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Jordan’s brother had sold
Byrd’s car with the fraudulent intent required to commit theft within the
meaning of the policy.
The
decision of the lower court was reversed.
Byrd
vs. United States Automobile
Association-No. A12A001-Court of Appeals of Georgia-June 26, 2012-2012 WL
2384426 (Ga. App.)